This paper investigates formal logics for reasoning about determinacy and independence. Propositional Dependence Logic D and Propositional Independence Logic I are recently developed logical systems, based on team semantics, that provide a framework for such reasoning tasks. We introduce two new logics L D and L I , based on Kripke semantics, and propose them as alternatives for D and I, respectively. We analyse the relative expressive powers of these four logics and discuss the way these systems relate to natural language. We argue that L D and L I naturally resolve a range of interpretational problems that arise in D and I. We also obtain sound and complete axiomatizations for L D and L I .
Introduction
In this paper we investigate the notions of propositional determinacy and propositional independence. We begin with a brief overview of related concepts.
Dependence and independence: brief historical notes
Dependence and independence are abstract notions that have played an important role in mathematics and the natural sciences since antiquity. Today the concepts are omnipresent in virtually all fields of science. There exists a wide range of different scientific notions of dependence, e.g., statistical correlation, the causal relationship, and functional dependence. Likewise, the notion of independence has different meanings in different contexts, e.g., probabilistic and linear independence in mathematics, as well as political and behavioural independence in social vernacular.
An early formal logical analysis of dependence was proposed by Grelling in [Gre39] 1 . Dependencies in relational databases have been studied since (at least) the pioneering work of Codd in the early 1970's. Of the many relevant references we only note here Armstrong's work [Arm74] which provides a set of axioms for the notion of functional dependence in databases.
The concept of dependence has also appeared in various philosophical contexts under various different names. From the point of view of the current article, the notion of supervenience is perhaps the most important related concept. The paper [MB14] describes supervenience formally as follows: "A set of properties A supervenes upon another set B just in case no two things can differ with respect to A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties. In slogan form, 'there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference'."
On the formal level, perhaps the closest in spirit to the present study regarding dependence is Humberstone's logical formalisation and study of supervenience as a generalisation of logical consequence in, e.g., [Hum92, Hum93, Hum98] Another notion related to the current paper is the notion of contingency. Formal investigations of contingency can be found in, inter alia, [MR66] , [Hum95, Hum02] , as well as [Piz07, Piz13] . For a recent study of the contingency operator in various modal logics, see [FWvD15] .
In the context of logical semantics, the notion of independence has been investigated perhaps most prominently in Independence Friendly (IF) Logic of Hintikka and Sandu [HS89, Hin96] . IF logic was first formulated in terms of game-theoretic semantics, and no compositional semantics for that logic was originally available. Later on, Hodges developed in [Hod97] a compositional semantics for the system, currently know as team semantics. The idea of team semantics, in turn, lead to Väänänen's development of Dependence Logic [Vää07] . Dependence logic sparked a renewed interest in logical formalisation and analysis of dependence and initiated an active related research programme. For an overview of the work in that direction, see [Kon13, GV14] and the references therein.
Propositional logics of dependence and independence based on team semantics
Väänänen's Dependence Logic extends classical first-order logic with dependence atoms D(x 1 , ..., x k ; y)
with the intuitive meaning that the choice of an interpretation for y is functionally determined by the choices of interpretations for x 1 , ..., x k in evaluation games based on game-theoretic semantics. Since the introduction of dependence atoms, research on logics based on team semantics has flourished and several kinds of related logical systems have been investigated.
A propositional modal variant of Dependence Logic, called Modal Dependence Logic, was defined by Väänänen in [Vää08] . That logic extends the syntax of ordinary modal logic with a new operator D and formulae D(p 1 , . . . , p k ; q) with the intuitive interpretation that the truth values of p 1 , . . . , p k determine the truth value of q. The propositional fragment of Modal Dependence Logic extended with D gives rise to Propositional Dependence Logic D.
In the logic D, sets of propositional assignments are called teams; recall that a propositional assignment is simply a function from a set of atomic proposition symbols to the Boolean domain {0, 1}. Intuitively, a team can be regarded as a set of possible worlds. A formula D(p; q) is then defined to be true in a team W if and only if each pair of possible worlds w, u ∈ W that give the same truth value to p, must also give the same value to q. The more complex atoms D(p 1 , . . . , p k ; q) are interpreted in a similar fashion: any pair of worlds in W that agree on the truth values of p 1 , . . . , p k , must also agree on the value of q (see Section 2 for the formal definition.) The propositions p 1 , . . . , p k are said to determine q.
The notion of independence which we investigate in this paper originates from Independence Logic of Grädel and Väänänen [GV13] . Analogously to Dependence Logic, Independence Logic extends first-order logic by independence atoms (x 1 , . . . , x i ) I (y 1 ,...,y j ) (z 1 , . . . , z k ), with the intuitive meaning that for any fixed set of values for y 1 , . . . , y j , the possible values for x 1 , . . . , x i are independent of the possible values for z 1 , . . . , z k . A propositional variant of Independence Logic, called Propositional Independence Logic (and denoted here by I) has been investigated in the literature (in, e.g., [KMSV14] , [Yan14] ), and it relates to Independence Logic the same way Propositional Dependence Logic relates to Dependence Logic.
Dependence Logic and Independence Logic, together with the Inclusion Logic of Galliani [Gal12] , are currently the central logical systems studied in the framework of team semantics.
The content and contributions of this paper
While many of the semantic choices underlying Propositional Dependence Logic D are natural and justified, we will identify in this paper a range of issues that are more problematic. One such issue is the interpretation of formulae that use combinations of determinacy operators D and disjunctions ∨. We will argue that while team semantics gives a sensible interpretation to formulae D(p 1 , ..., p k ; q) as well as disjunctive formulae ϕ∨ψ free of operators D, interpretations of certain simple formulae that combine D and ∨ become strange from the point of view of natural language. We also discuss similar issues related to the team semantics interpretation of negation ¬.
Motivated by the interpretational problems of D, we develop here an alternative very natural logic of determinacy called Propositional Logic of Determinacy and denoted by L D . The logics D and L D have essentially the same set of formulae, 2 but the semantic approaches differ. Instead of team semantics, the system L D is essentially based on Kripke semantics. A formula D(ϕ 1 , ..., ϕ k ; ψ) is true in a possible world w if the set R(w) of accessible alternatives of w satisfies the determinacy condition: for all u, v ∈ R(w), if u and v agree on the truth values of each ϕ i , they also agree on the truth value of ψ. The Boolean connectives as well as proposition symbols are interpreted in L D in the same way as in Kripke semantics, and thus L D can be regarded as a modal logic with a generalized modality D that talks about determinacy rather than possibility or necessity. Mainly in order to keep matters technically simple in this initial work on L D , we assume the accessibility relation R to be the universal relation, so the set of successors of any world w is in fact the whole domain of the model. At the end of the paper we briefly discuss the general case.
As an important part of our discourse on L D , we present a range or arguments for the naturalness of L D in relation to natural language. In particular, we argue that L D resolves reasonably well the interpretational problems that we identify for D.
It turns out that Propositional Independence Logic I is burdened by virtually the same issues as Propositional Dependence Logic D, and these issues can be remedied by defining Propositional Logic of Independence L I analogously to L D but based on the independence operator I rather than the dependence operator D.
In addition to introducing the logics L D and L I and discussing how they, as well as D and I, relate to each other and to natural language, we also provide a comparative analysis of the expressive powers of these four logics. We show that, while D and I are both strictly contained in L D and L I , the latter two logics are equally expressive. In fact, we establish in Sections 3 and 4 that L D and L I are maximally expressive, or expressively complete, in a certain natural sense. Since it is well known from the literature on team semantics that D is strictly contained in I, we eventually obtain a complete classification of the relative expressive powers of the four logics.
We also prove that while both D and I translate into both L D and L I , there exists no compositional translation 3 from either of the team-semantics-based logics into L D or L I . Intuitively, this indicates that team semantics and the Kripke-style semantics of L D and L I are substantially different logical frameworks, at least from the technical point of view.
In addition to studying expressivity issues, we provide sound and complete axiomatizations for L D and L I . This turns out to be a relatively straightforward, yet interesting exercise, due to certain close connections-to be identified below-between L D , L I and Contingency Logic [MR66] . Contingency Logic is the variant of modal logic with a modality C, where Cϕ is interpreted to mean that ϕ is non-contingent at the state of evaluation, i.e., has the same truth value at every successor of that state. We also show that there do not exist finite axiomatisations for L D and L I , assuming a standard notion of an axiomatic deduction system.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we provide the necessary background for the rest of the paper, including definitions of the logics D and I based on team semantics. In Sections 3 and 4 we define the logics L D and L I and study their basic properties. Section 5 analyses the logics D, I, L D and L I in relation to natural language. Section 6 investigates expressivity issues and Section 7 provides sound and complete axiomatizations for L D and L I . Section 8 briefly discusses a range of future research directions and concludes the paper.
The agenda of the current paper, i.e., investigating dependence logic with a Kripke-style semantics instead of team semantics, has been previously mentioned in passing and very briefly motivated in [Kuu14] and its later incarnations such as [Kuu15] . The current paper develops the ideas suggested there in proper detail, and furthermore, provides an extensive collection of related technical results concerning the expressivity and axiomatizability of L D and related systems.
Preliminaries and background

Functional determinacy
Determinacy of a function by a set of functions is a central concept in this paper. We will define it here in the general setting, though will use it further only on Boolean functions.
Definition 2.1. Let k ∈ Z + be a positive integer and let X, X 1 , . . . , X k , U be nonempty sets.
3 See Section 6.4 for the definition of compositional translations.
Let f : U → X be function, and consider a family of functions
Given a set W ⊆ U , we say that the function f is determined by the family of functions {f 1 , . . . , f k } on W , or that the family {f 1 , . . . , f k } determines the function f on W , if there exists a function F : X 1 × . . . × X k → X such that f is the composition of F and the functions f 1 , . . . , f k on W , that is, f (w) = F (f 1 (w), . . . , f k (w)) for every w ∈ W . We also fix this definition in the following special case: we say that a function g : U → X is determined by ∅ on W ⊆ U if g is constant on W , i.e., g(w 1 ) = g(w 2 ) for all w 1 , w 2 ∈ W .
This definition generalises straightforwardly to determinacy of a function by any family of functions {f i : U → X i | i ∈ I} indexed with an arbitrary (possibly infinite) set I.
Equivalently, f is determined by the (possibly empty) family {f 1 , . . . , f k } on W if and only if the following condition holds.
Indeed, if f is the composition of a mapping F with f 1 , . . . , f k on W and
Conversely, if the condition Det holds, then we can define a mapping F : X 1 × . . . × X k → X as follows:
, for some w ∈ W, x otherwise (where x ∈ X is arbitrarily fixed).
The condition Det guarantees that this is well-defined.
We let Det W (f 1 , . . . , f k ; f ) denote the assertion that f is determined by the family of functions {f 1 , . . . , f k } on W . When k = 0, we write Det W (∅ ; f ).
Preliminaries concerning propositional logic
We typically denote formulae by ϕ, ψ, χ, θ, α, β and sets of formulae by Φ, Ψ. Throughout the paper, we let PROP denote a fixed countably infinite set of proposition symbols. All formulae considered in the paper will be assumed to be built over PROP.
Let Φ = {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k } be a finite nonempty set of formulae. We define a set DNF (Φ) as follows.
1. For each subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , k}, let ψ S denote the conjunction ψ 1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψ k such that
We call the formulae in DNF (Φ) type normal form formulae over Φ.
In the above definition, ∅ is assumed to be the formula p ∧ ¬p for some proposition symbol p ∈ PROP. We will not assume that the logical constant symbols ⊤, ⊥ are available as primitives in the languages we consider. However, we will use these symbols as abbreviations for the formulae p ∨ ¬p and p ∧ ¬p, respectively. For technical convenience, we define DNF (∅) := {⊤, ⊥} and Conj (∅) := {⊤}, and thus we let ⊤ be the unique type over ∅.
When we write a formula θ(q 1 , . . . , q k ), we indicate that all the propositional variables occurring in θ are amongst q 1 , . . . , q k . Given a formula θ = θ(q 1 , . . . , q k ) and a tuple of formulae ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k , we denote by θ(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k ) the result of a uniform substitution of ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k , respectively, for q 1 , . . . , q k in the formula θ.
State description models
Recall that PROP denotes a fixed countably infinite set of proposition symbols. An assignment for PROP is any mapping f : PROP → {0, 1}. Following Carnap, we occasionally call assignments also state descriptions.
Any (possibly empty) set W of state descriptions will be called a state description model (or SD-model). The reason we include the empty model in the picture is technical and related to the the fact that we will deal, inter alia, with logics based on team semantics. In team semantics, as we will see, the empty team plays an important role.
Especially in the more technical parts of the paper, we often talk about points or worlds of W rather than assignments or state descriptions.
Universal modality
In this paper we use a variant L U of the modal logic with the universal modality [GP92] . Formally, the syntax of the logic L U is given by the grammar
where p ∈ PROP. We define U to be the dual of [U], i.e., U ϕ :
The semantics of L U is defined with respect to SD-models W and assignments w ∈ W as follows.
As customary in modal logic, we define W |= U ϕ iff W, w |= U ϕ for all w ∈ W . We also define, in the standard way, that |= U ϕ iff W |= U ϕ for all SD-models W .
Propositional Dependence Logic D
We now define Propositional Dependence Logic D, which first appeared in the literature on team semantics as a syntactic fragment of Modal Dependence Logic, defined by Väänänen in [Vää08] . The paper [Vää08] did not make explicit references to D, and the semantics for Modal Dependence Logic-including its propositional fragment-was formulated in [Vää08] in terms of Kripke models rather than SD-models.
Propositional Dependence Logic, with that explicit name, and variants of the logic have recently been studied in, e.g., [Yan14, YV14, HLSV14, HKMV15]. The models for Propositional Dependence Logic are currently typically defined in the literature as SD-models where the set of proposition symbols in consideration is finite; thus the related SD-models are sets of finite state descriptions, i.e., finite assignments. For most purposes, it makes little difference whether SD-models with a finite or infinite set of proposition symbols are used. Similarly, it is mostly unimportant whether the models under consideration are Kripke models or SDmodels. Such distinctions could, however, become more important in extensions and variants of the logics considered in this paper.
The syntax of Propositional Dependence Logic D is given by the following grammar (cf.
[Vää08]),
where p, q, p 1 , . . . , p k ∈ PROP and k ∈ N. When considering formulae D(p 1 , . . . , p k ; q) where k = 0, we write Cϕ instead of D(; q) or D(ǫ ; q), where ǫ denotes the empty sequence of proposition symbols.
We let FOR(D) denote the set of formulae of D. Note that formulae of D are in negation normal form, and the operator D takes as inputs only proposition symbols.
Let W be a state description model. The semantics of Propositional Dependence Logic D, to be defined below, is based on team semantics 4 , given by the following clauses (cf. [Vää08, YV14] ). 
where the expression above is obtained by negating the condition provided in the truth definition of D(p 1 , . . . , p k ; q) after the universal quantification of u and v. 5 We then observe that according to the obtained definition, we have
While team semantics may seem strange at first, the following proposition justifies its naturalness with respect to propositional logic, i.e., the sublanguage of D without formulae of the type D(p 1 , . . . , p k ; q) and ¬D(p 1 , . . . , p k ; q). Recall that the turnstile |= U refers to L U . Proposition 2. 3 . Let ϕ be a formula of propositional logic in negation normal form. Then
This proposition shows that team semantics simply lifts the semantics of propositional logic (in negation normal form) from the level of individual assignments onto the level of sets of assignments. Thus, team semantics can be used in scenarios where assertions (encoded by formulae of propositional logic) are made about sets of possible worlds, and the intention of the assertions is to claim that any world in the set satisfies the formula. We will consider examples of such scenarios in Section 5, where we discuss the interaction between natural language and the logic D.
Propositional Independence Logic I
We next present Propositional Independence Logic I, which was conceived as a fragment of Modal Independence Logic in [KMSV14] and studied further in, e.g., [HKVV15] . Propositional 5 In other words, if we abbreviate the truth condition for p by ∀w ∈ W : Ψ and the truth condition for D(p1, . . . , p k ; q) by ∀u, v ∈ W : Ψ ′ , then the truth condition for ¬p is ∀w ∈ W : ¬Ψ and thus we define the condition for ¬D(p1, . . . , p k ; q) to be ∀u, v ∈ W : ¬Ψ ′ . How natural this choice is exactly, is a question that calls for further analysis. We will briefly discuss issues related to this matter in Section 5.
Independence Logic relates to Independence Logic of Grädel and Väänänen [GV13] in the same way D relates to Väänänen's Dependence Logic. There are, of course, different kinds of notions of independence, and the logic I provides a formal approach to a particular such notion. The logic is similar in spirit to D, being based on team semantics.
The syntax of I is given by the following grammar.
where p and each of the symbols p i , r i , q i are proposition symbols in PROP. We denote by FOR(I) the set of formulae of I. The numbers k and n are positive integers and m a non-negative integer. When m = 0, the atom (
Also, when any of the three tuples of proposition symbols in the formula (p 1 , . . . , p k ) I (r 1 ,...,rm) (q 1 , . . . , q n ) contains exactly one formula, the brackets around the tuple are usually left out, as for example in the formula p I r q.
Notice that, in line with the definition of I in [KMSV14, HKVV15] , negation and I can only be applied to propositional symbols. In particular, formulae (p 1 , . . . , p k ) I (r 1 ,...,rm) (q 1 , . . . , q n ) may not occur negated. The same convention applies to independence atoms in Independence Logic [GV13] .
The semantics of I is defined with respect to SD-models. Intuitively, the formula
asserts that when the truth values of the proposition symbols r 1 , . . . , r m are fixed, then the tuples of truth values of (p 1 , . . . , p k ) and (q 1 , . . . , q n ) are informationally independent in a way explained further after the formal truth definition of I.
We use I as the semantic turnstile of I. The formal semantic clauses of I for propositional literals and Boolean connectives are exactly the same as those for the logic D, while the semantics of the formulae
is defined as follows. Let W be a state description model. We define
iff for all w 1 , w 2 ∈ W that agree on r 1 , . . . , r m (i.e., are such that . . , p k ) and (q 1 , . . . , q n ) are informationally independent of each other on S in the sense that for every two assignments w 1 , w 2 ∈ S, there is an assignment v ∈ S that combines w 1 restricted to (p 1 , . . . , p k ) with w 2 restricted to (q 1 , . . . , q n ).
It is worth noting that, intuitively, the formula p I q can be interpreted to state that nothing new can be concluded about the truth value of p in a possible world w by finding out the truth value of q in w (and vice versa): an agent who fully knows the model W but has no idea which w ∈ W is the actual world, cannot conclude anything new about the truth value of q in the actual world by learning the truth value of p in that world.
This interpretation explains the initially perhaps counterintuitive fact that the formula p I p is satisfiable even in nonempty models: W I p I p holds iff p is constant in W , i.e., if every assignment in W gives the same truth value to p. Indeed, p being constant means exactly that nothing new can be concluded about the truth value p in the actual world by learning the truth value of p in the actual world. If p was not constant, the truth value of p in the actual world would obviously reveal new information.
It is worth pointing out here that in the semantics of D and I, there is no explicit actual world present. Next we will consider the logics L D and L I whose semantics is given in a way similar to Kripke semantics in terms of pairs (W, w), where W is a SD-model and w ∈ W an assignment which corresponds to an appointed actual world.
Propositional logic of determinacy L D
We now introduce a new logic which extends propositional logic PL with dependence formulae
, where ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k , ψ are arbitrary formulae in the language. We call this logic Propositional Logic of Determinacy and denote it by L D .
Recall that PROP denotes a fixed countably infinite set of proposition symbols. The formulae of L D over PROP are defined by the following grammar.
where p ∈ PROP, and where the tuple (ϕ, . . . , ϕ ; ϕ) contains k + 1 formulae for any k ∈ N. We consider the Boolean connectives ∧, ∨, ↔ as abreviations in the usual way. When k = 0, we write Cϕ instead of D(ǫ; ϕ), where ǫ is the empty sequence of formulae. We let FOR(L D ) denote the set of formulae of L D . Notice indeed that each of the operators ¬, →, D can be freely used in the language of L D ; no syntactic restrictions apply.
Intuitively, D(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k ; ψ) means that the truth value of ϕ is determined by the set of truth values of the formulae ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k on the SD-model in consideration. In particular, Cϕ means that the truth value of ϕ is constant in the model.
We define truth of an L D -formula ϕ at a state description w in an SD-model W , denoted W, w |= D ϕ, inductively on the structure of formulae as follows.
When an SD-model W is fixed, the assignments w ∈ W can be extended to truth assignments w * : FOR(L) → {0, 1} in the natural way. The same, of course, applies for L U .
Note that the truth definition of D(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k ; ϕ) extends the semantics of D in the logic D and does not depend on the current state description w but only on the entire SD-model W .
In particular, the semantics of C is as follows: W, w |= Cϕ iff for all u, v ∈ W , we have that W, u |= ϕ iff W, v |= ϕ. In other words, W, w |= Cϕ iff the truth value of ϕ is constant in the model.
Let us rephrase the semantic definition of D above in terms of explicit functional dependence.
The semantics of L D is similar to Kripke semantics in the case where the accessibility relation of a model W is the universal relation W × W . Therefore it is natural to define for L D the notions of validity and satisfiability analogously to the corresponding definitions in modal logic:
3. ϕ is satisfiable if W, w |= ϕ for some SD-model W = ∅ and some w ∈ W .
The following definition is analogous to the definition of local equivalence in modal logic:
We write ϕ ≡ L D ψ if the equivalence W, w |= ϕ ⇔ W, w |= ψ holds for all SD-models W and all w ∈ W . We will often omit the subscript L D when no confusion arises.
We note that validity in an SD-model can be expressed locally in L D as follows: In turn, D is expressible in terms of [u] in the following sense:
Proof. Let us denote the formula on the right hand side by ∆(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k ; ψ). Consider any SD-model W . Define ψ W := {w ∈ W | W, w |= ψ}. For each w ∈ W , let χ w be the unique type over {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k } which is true at w; in the case k = 0, let χ w := ⊤. Define The above results suggest obvious equivalence-preserving translations between L D and L U . However, while this connection between L D and L U is intersting and useful, the aim of this paper is to study the operator D taken as a primitive, the focus being on the comparison of Propositional Dependence Logic D and the new logic L D . Furthermore, neither of the above mentioned translations is polynomial.
The following is a straightforward observation about L D which we will use later on.
Lemma 3.4. The logic L D satisfies the equivalent replacement property ER with respect to the equivalence given in Definition 3.2.
We say that a class
Let w : PROP → {0, 1} be an assignment function, and let Φ ⊆ PROP. We let w| Φ denote the restriction of w to Φ, i.e., the function f : Φ → {0, 1} defined so that f (p) = w(p) for all p ∈ Φ. We denote by W | Φ the model { w| Φ | w ∈ W }.
Definition 3.5. Two SD-models W 1 and W 2 are Φ-equivalent, denoted
Definition 3.6. A class of SD-models C is closed under finite propositional equivalence, if the following conditions hold.
∅ ∈ C.
2. There exists a finite set Φ ⊆ PROP such that for all nonempty SD-models W 1 and
The first condition above has been included for technical convenience. Note that the empty model satisfies every formula of L U and L D .
Proposition 3.7. A class of SD-models is definable in L U iff it is closed under finite propositional equivalence.
Proof. Suppose a class of SD-models C is definable in L U by some formula ϕ and let Φ ⊆ PROP be the set of proposition symbols that occur in ϕ. Then for all SD-models W 1 and W 2 , if W 1 ∈ C and W 1 ≡ Φ W 2 , then W 1 |= ϕ and thus W 2 |= ϕ, whence W 2 ∈ C. Thus C is closed under finite propositional equivalence.
Now, suppose C is closed under finite propositional equivalence and let Φ ⊆ PROP be a finite set such that for all nonempty SD-models W 1 and
Define a characteristic formula ϕ W of a model W = ∅ as follows. For each w ∈ W , let χ w be the unique propositional type in Conj (Φ) such that W, w |= χ w . Define
which of course can be regarded as a finite formula since we can eliminate repeated conjuncts and disjuncts.
which again can be regarded as a finite formula.
Then C is defined by ∆(Φ, C). Indeed, ∆(Φ, C) is true in every model W ∈ C. Conversely, every SD-model U = ∅ satisfying ∆(Φ, C) satisfies some disjunct, i.e., some characteristic formula ϕ W of some model W ∈ C \ {∅}. Clearly U ≡ Φ W , whence we have U ∈ C.
Consequently, we obtain a characterisation of the expressive power of L D :
Let Φ = ∅ be a finite subset of PROP. Let C denote the set of all SD-models in restriction to Φ, i.e., the set { W | Φ | W is an SD-model }. We call C the set of Φ-models and denote it by M(Φ).
Proposition 3.9. L U and L D are expressively complete in the sense that for any finite nonempty Φ ⊆ PROP and any S ⊆ M(Φ) with ∅ ∈ S, the set S is definable in restric-
Proof. The claim for L U is established by an argument that is almost identical to the proof of Proposition 3.7. The claim for L D then follows by the equiexpressivity of L D and L U .
Propositional Logic of Independence L I
We have defined the logic of L D as an extension of propositional logic PL with the operator D.
Next, we introduce Propositional Logic of Independence L I which extends PL in a similar way, but now with the operator I instead of D. The logic L I relates to Propositional Independence Logic I analogously to the way L D relates to Propositional Dependence Logic D.
The language of Propositional Logic of Independence L I is given by the following grammar.
where p ∈ PROP, and each of the three tuples (ϕ, . . . , ϕ) in the expression
is a finite tuple of formulae; the tuples in the same expression may be of different lengths, but only the tuple in the subscript may possibly be empty. Instead of writing
we simply write (ϕ, . . . , ϕ) I (ϕ, . . . , ϕ). As in L D , we consider the Boolean connectives ⊥, ∧, ∨, ↔ definable as usual. Sometimes we leave out brackets of formulae of L I , following the convention that the operator I has a higher priority than all binary connectives, while negation has a higher priority than all other operators (incluing I ). We let FOR(L I ) denote the set of formulae of L I .
The semantics of L I is similar to that of L D and defined with respect to SD-models W and assignments w ∈ W . Propositional symbols and Boolean operators are interpreted exactly as in L D . To define the semantics for I , recall that in an SD-model W with a Kripke-style semantics, each w ∈ W can be extended to a truth function w * : FOR(L) → {0, 1} such that w * (ϕ) = 1 iff W, w |= ϕ. The truth definition of the operator I extends the one in the logic I as follows. We define W, w
Thus the operator I of L I extends I of I so that in L I the operator can be applied to all formulae, not only proposition symbols. Note that the semantics of I (which we defined with respect to the model W and world w ∈ W ) does not directly depend on the world w but is global in the model.
Analogously to the conventions fixed in Definition 3.1 for L D , we say that a formula ϕ of L I is valid in a model W (denoted W |= L I ϕ), if ϕ is true in every world of W , and that ϕ is valid
holds for all models W and all w ∈ W .
The following two lemmas are straightforward to prove. For Lemma 4.2, recall the definition of Φ-equivalence of SD-models from Definition 3.5.
Lemma 4.1. The logic L I satisfies the equivalent replacements property ER with respect to
Since both logics L D and L I are interpreted with respect to SD-models W and assignments w ∈ W , it is easy to compare them. We define the following simple translation t from L D into L I :
In particular, we have t(Cψ) := ψ I ψ. (Recall our discussion in Section 2.6 concerning formulae of the type p I p.)
Now we make some simple but useful observations. Proof. The proof of the first claim is straightforward, using the translation t defined above. The second claim is also straightforward, based on the obvious variant t ′ of the translation t that keeps proposition symbols and Boolean connectives the same and translates
We note that the translation from D into I mentioned in the above proof is well known from the literature on team semantics.
We define [u ′ ]ϕ be an abbreviation for the formula ϕ ∧ ϕ I ϕ of L I , and we let u ′ ϕ denote ¬[u ′ ]¬ϕ. Note that [u ′ ] corresponds to the universal modality in an obvious way. To see how the independence operator I can be expressed in terms of u ′ , consider a formula
Now, recall the notation Conj (Φ) from Section 2.2, including also the special case for Φ = ∅ which stipulates that Conj (∅) = {⊤}. Define
Proposition 4.4.
Proof. It is easy to see that the bottom formula describes the semantics of the operator I in terms of u ′ in a rather direct way.
We will complete the expressivity analysis of the logics L D , L I , D, and I in Section 6.
Natural language and logics of determinacy and independence
In this section we interpret the logics D and L D in relation to natural language and compare their respective properties. We will not discuss I explicitly here, but since I is technically quite similar to D, many of the observations below concerning D apply to I as well.
The principal argument of the section is that L D is-at least in some important respects-a better match than D with natural language intuitions concerning statements about logical determinacy. It is sufficient for our purposes to consider formulae with only the connectives ¬ and ∨ together with determinacy assertions of the type D(p; q). We make the assumption that the desirable natural language counterparts of ¬ and ∨ should always be "it is not the case that" and "or," respectively. Formulae D(p; q) should correspond to assertions stating that "whether P holds, determines whether Q holds." Here P and Q denote suitable natural language interpretations of p and q. A different kind of analysis would arise if, for example, ¬ was to be read as "it is never the case that" or "it is impossible that."
Our argument will proceed as follows. We first argue that the semantics of formulae of the type p ∨ q is a good match with natural language intuitions in both logics L D and D. We then turn to examples concerning formulae of the type D(p; q), and again argue that the semantics of both logics is reasonable. (In this context we also briefly discuss more complex formulae of the type D(p, q; r), but this is not crucial from the point of view of our discussion.) We then argue that, despite both p ∨ q and D(p; q) having a reasonable semantics in D, formulae D(p; q) ∨ D(p ′ ; q ′ ), which combine ∨ and D, are problematic. In fact, we show this even for the formula D(p; q) ∨ D(p; q), where both disjuncts are the same. We then continue by arguing that L D , in turn, gives natural interpretations for these problematic examples. Finally, we briefly discuss formulae of the type ¬D(p; q).
As we saw in the previous section (cf. Proposition 2.3), team semantics is simply classical semantics lifted to the level of sets: if ϕ is a formula of propositional logic PL, then, in the setting of team semantics, W ϕ simply means that each world in W satisifies ϕ. Even the semantics of disjunction ∨, which may appear strange at first, makes perfect sense from that perspective. Let us consider an example where team semantics seems to give a correct interpretation (from the natural language perspective) to the disjunctive formula p ∨ q.
Consider the following propositions.
• "The patient has an ear infection", encoded by p.
• "The patient has high blood pressure", encoded by q.
Assume a set W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 } of possible scenarios has been identified by a clinician after inspecting a patient with vertigo, where
The set W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 } is assumed here to be the set of exactly all scenarios which the clinician considers possible. The clinician has informed the patient about his situation, so the patient also considers W to be the set of all possible scenarios. To summarize the discussion with the patient, and to repeat what the situtaion is, the clinician then states to the patient: "So, you have an ear infection or high blood pressure."
The clinician seems to be asserting that "W p ∨ q," i.e., that the set W of all possible scenarios splits into worlds that satisfy p and worlds that satisfy q. Thus team semantics works correctly here. The interpretation "W p or W q" has a different meaning, which is false in this case.
In this example, the assertion p ∨ q was made about the set W of possible states of affairs, i.e., sets of assignments. Since team semantics is based on sets of assignments (rather than individual assignments), it is a natural framework for interpreting determinacy atoms D(p 1 , . . . , p k ; q). We next give natural language examples that should convince the reader that the semantics of the operator D given by D is a good match with intuitions concerning statements about propositional determinacy.
Consider now a scenario with two containers of water in two laboratory ovens. Fix the following propositions.
• "The thermometer shows over 100 • Celcius", denoted by p.
• "The water is boiling", denoted by q.
Assume the setting is encoded by the set W = {w 1 , w 2 }, with one possible world for each container, such that w 1 = {p, q} and w 2 = ∅. By w 1 = {p, q} we of course mean that w 1 (p) = 1 and w 1 (q) = 1, and analogously, w 2 = ∅ means that w 2 (p) = 0 and w 2 (q) = 0.
Consider the following assertion:
"Whether the temperature is over 100 • Celsius determines whether the water is boiling."
It is natural to interpret the assertion to mean that W D(p; q). Thus the semantics of D seems to work fine here. For another example, extend the above setting with a third oven w 3 with a water container and a new proposition r which asserts that the air pressure in the oven is over 1 bar. Let W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 }, where
This time the temperature being over 100 • Celsius does not determine whether the water is boiling, i.e., W D(p; q), because both w 1 and w 3 satisfy p, but the two worlds disagree on the truth value of q. However, we do have that W D(p, r; q). By adding yet another world w 4 = {p, q, r} encoding a fourth oven, we end up with a laboratory where W D(p, r; q).
A scenario where D(p, r; q) seems to hold universally, i.e., in every correctly designed set W of possible worlds, can be obtained for example by considering a setting where each world is associated with a balance scale and two equally heavy weights. Let p encode the assertion that exactly one weight has been placed on the left tray of the balance scale, and r the corresponding assertion concerning the right tray; q is the assertion that the scale is in balance. Now, indeed, D(p, r; q) holds for any collection of physically possible worlds, with q being true exactly when either p and r are both true or when they are both false.
We have seen that team semantics works fine on simple disjunctive formulae p ∨ q and and determinacy statements D(p; q). We next combine disjunctions and determinacy statements and show that this leads to problematic interpretations from the point of view of natural language.
Let p denote the assertion that the sun is shining, and q the assertion that it is winter. Consider a setting where W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 }, with all possible distributions of truth values for p and q realized. Now clearly W D(p; q), so whether the sun is shining does not determine whether it is winter. However, W D(p; q)∨D(p; q) holds in D. This seems strange. Consider the following translation of the formula D(p; q) ∨ D(p; q) into natural language.
" Whether the sun is shining determines whether it is winter, or, whether the sun is shining determines whether it is winter."
The intuitively correct interpretation of the above statement seems to be the (indeed false) assertion that "W D(p; q) or W D(p; q)," rather than the (true) assertion "W D(p; q) ∨ D(p; q)" suggested by team semantics. The natural language statement "Whether the sun is shining determines whether it is winter, or, whether the sun is shining determines whether it is winter " seems obviously false. Therefore team semantics here gives an undesired interpretation to the formula D(p; q) ∨ D(p; q). In fact, we observe that the formula ϕ := D(p; q) ∨ D(p; q) is a validity of D, i.e., we have W |= ϕ for every SD-model W .
For another example, consider the formula D(p; q) ∨ D(r; q), where p, q and r stand for "It is dark", "John is at home", and "It is cold" respectively. Assume all distributions of truth values of the propositions p, q, r are realized in W . Now W D(p; q) ∨ D(r; q) holds in D. This is again counterintuitive from the natural language point of view. Like the formula D(p; q) ∨ D(p; q), also the formula D(p; q) ∨ D(r; q) is a validity of D. In fact, every formula of the type D(p 1 , . . . , p k ; q) ∨ D(r 1 , . . . , r n ; q) is a validity of D, because every SD-model W can be split into sets U, V ⊆ W such that U ∪ V = W and each assignment in U satisfies q while each assignment in V satisfies ¬q.
Before we discuss how L D deals with the above formulae, we note once more that our analysis assumes that ∨ should correspond to the natural language "or." Of course there is no reason to assume that the natural language word or should have any unique interpretation even in very simple settings: already the inclusive and exclusive modes of or demonstrate this issue. However, L D works quite nicely in the above examples.
Concerning the formula p ∨ q in the beginning of the section, we have W p ∨ q iff W |= p ∨ q. We will not try to give an elaborated account of how well exactly L D corresponds to natural language, but it is essential to notice that L D can be considered to have a similar level of naturalness as standard S5 modal logic or modal logic with the universal modality. The reason for this is that a similar Kripke style semantics is used, and furthermore, it can be argued that L D is simply a fragment of the modal logic S5. This is because determinacy statements are naturally definable in terms of statements about possibility: simply consider the direct natural language translation of the equivalence
where u should be read as "it is possible that." The natural language translation of this equivalence indeed seems intuitively immediately appealing, and importantly, the equivalence essentially just states the formal semantics of D(p; q) in terms of diamonds u . Thus L D can be considered a fragment of modal logic with the universal modality, or a fragment of S5, and the level of correspondence between natural language and L D is similar to the corresponding relationship for S5. The above equivalence deals only with the simple determinacy formula D(p; q) but it is easy to generalize our argument to more complex formulae. (See also Proposition 3. 3.) In addition to the disjunction ∨, also the semantics of negation ¬ in D can be counterintuitive if the reading "it is not the case that" is desired for ¬. For example, let p and q denote the assertions "the Riemann hypothesis holds" and "it is raining," respectively. To give an example of how the semantics of ¬ works in D (and L D ) in the context of formulae of PL, let p and q denote the assertions "John has a cat" and "John is married," respectively. Assume a scenario where it is agreed that the possible worlds are w 1 = {p} and w 2 = ∅, i.e., John may or may not have a cat, but he is definitely not married. Let W = {w 1 , w 2 }.
The assertion "It is not the case that John is married" seems correct, and indeed, we have W ¬q. Note, however, that even though W p, the claim "it is not the case that John has a cat" would seem odd. To make the claim W p, one would have to assert, e.g., that it is possible that John does not have a cat, or that it is not necessarily the case that John has a cat.
Comparing the expressive powers of D, I, L D and L I
We have earlier observed (Proposition 4.3) that L D embeds into L I , and also that D embeds into I. In this section we will complete our discussion concerning the expressive powers of the logics L D , L I , D and I.
I does not embed into D Let ϕ, ψ ∈ FOR(D) ∪ FOR(I).
We write ϕ ≡ team ψ if the equivalence W ϕ ⇔ W ψ holds for all SD-models W . The first result we wish to point out is well-known; we prove it for the sake of completeness. 
6.2
Embedding L I into L D via a concrete translation
While D embeds into I but not vice versa, the situation is different for L D and L I . In Section 2.6 we established that L D embeds into L I . We now define a translation showing that L I embeds into L D , too. While it is straightforward to observe, based on Propositions 3.7 and 3.9 , that L I indeed embeds into L D , the concrete translation below will be of interest later on when we discuss compositional translations (to be defined) between the logics under investigation. We define the following translation s :
4. We then translate the formula (ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k ) I (θ 1 ,...,θm) (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ) in a way that derives from Proposition 4.4. First we define
For the special case where m = 0, recall that Conj (∅) = {⊤}. Now, let
It is easy to see that the translation of the operator I given by the formula above describes the meaning of I quite directly in terms of u .
The proof of the next claim is straightforward, using the translation s defined above.
Proposition 6.2. L I embeds into L D i.e., for each formula ϕ of L I , there exists an equivalent formula ψ of L D in the sense that for all W and all w ∈ W , we have W, w |= ϕ iff W, w |= ψ.
Strict embedding of D and I into L D and L I
Next we will show that the team-semantics-based logic I is strictly contained in the Kripkestyle logic L D in the following sense.
1. For each formula ϕ of I, there exists a formula ϕ ′ of L D such that ϕ and ϕ ′ define the same class of SD-models, i.e.,
2. There exists a formula ψ of L D which is not equivalent to any formula of I, i.e., for all formulae ψ ′ of I, there exists a model W such that (W ψ ′ and W |= ψ) or (W ψ ′ and W |= ψ).
The condition 1 above is essentially obvious, since all classes of models definable in I are closed under finite propositional equivalence, and due to Proposition 3.7, L D can define all such model classes. However, we will provide an explicit and effective translation of I into L D which is interesting in its own right and also elucidates the semantics of I. Furthermore, despite the simplicity of our translation, we will show in Section Section 6.4 that there does not exist a compositional translation from I into L D .
Recall once again the notion of a type normal form formula and related notions from Section 2. Let Φ be a finite nonempty set of proposition symbols and χ = {χ 1 , . . . , χ k } a formula in DNF (Φ). We let SPLIT (χ) denote the set of pairs (α, β) of type normal form formulae in DNF (Φ) such that if α = {α 1 , . . . , α m } and β = {β 1 , . . . , β n }, then
Let χ ∈ DNF (Φ). We define the following translation t χ from I into L D :
To translate the formula (p 1 , . . . , p k ) I (q 1 ,...,qm) (r 1 , . . . , r n ), we use a suitably modified version of the equivalence in Proposition 4.4. We first define
We then define
If ϕ is a formula of I and Φ the set of proposition symbols in ϕ, we let χ(ϕ) denote the formula in DNF (Φ) that contains as disjuncts all types over Φ. Note that the formula χ(ϕ) is a tautology.
We then prove that our translation of I into L D preserves truth.
Lemma 6. 3 .
Proof. Let ϕ be a formula of I and W a model. Let Φ be the set of proposition symbols that occur in the formula ϕ. If χ ∈ DNF (Φ), we let W χ denote the set of worlds in W that satisfy χ. We will show that for every χ ∈ DNF (Φ) and every subformula ψ of ϕ, we have
The claim of the Lemma will then follow, as W χ(ϕ) = W .
The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of ψ. The cases for proposition symbols, negated proposition symbols and conjunctions are straightforward. The argument for I is easy, as our translation in that case captures quite directly the semantics of I .
We now proceed with the case ψ = ψ ′ ∨ ψ ′′ . When going through the argument below, it helps to keep in mind the trivial technicality that for an SD-model U and a proper subset S of PROP, there may exist several assignments in U that are equivalent with respect to S, i.e., assignments that satisfy exactly the same propositions in S (but differ elsewhere).
Assume that W χ I ψ ′ ∨ ψ ′′ . Thus there exist sets S ′ , S ′′ ⊆ W χ such that S ′ I ψ ′ and S ′′ I ψ ′′ , and furthermore, S ′ ∪ S ′′ = W χ . Therefore there exists a pair (α, β) ∈ SPLIT (χ) such that S ′ ⊆ W α and S ′′ ⊆ W β , and furthermore, W α ≡ Φ S ′ and W β ≡ Φ S ′′ (recall Definition 3.5). Therefore clearly W α ψ ′ and W β ψ ′′ . Hence, by the induction hypothesis,
For the converse, assume that W |= L D t χ (ψ ′ ∨ ψ ′′ ). Therefore there exist type normal form formulae α, β such that (α, β) ∈ SPLIT (χ), and furthermore,
By the induction hypothesis, we have
We are now ready to establish the following theorem.
Theorem 6.4. The logic I is strictly contained in L D , i.e.:
1. For each ϕ ∈ FOR(I), there exists a formula ϕ ′ ∈ FOR(L D ) (which can be found effectively), such that for all SD-models W , it holds that W ϕ iff W |= ϕ ′ .
2. There exists a formula ψ ∈ FOR(L D ) that is not expressible in I, i.e., for all χ ∈ I, there exists an SD-model W such that the equivalence W |= ψ ⇔ W χ fails.
Proof. By Lemma 6.3 there exists an effective translation from I into L D . Hence we only need to establish the second claim of the theorem. In fact the claim follows relatively easily from Corollary 3.7 and the proof of Theorem 4.2 of [KMSV15], but we will prove it here explicitly.
We will show that the L D -formula ¬Cp is not expressible in I, i.e., there is no formula ψ of I such that
We first define two models U and U ′ , where U consists of two worlds, one satisfying p and the other one not, and U ′ consists of single world that does not satisfy p. Furthermore, for all other proposition symbols q, we define q to be false in each world of the models U , U ′ .
We then show by induction on the structure of formulae that for all ϕ ∈ FOR(I), we have
For the literals p and ¬p this is immediate, as U I p and U I ¬p. For other literals q, ¬q, etc., the implication holds because U I q and U ′ I ¬q. In order to deal with the operator I , notice that U ′ satisfies all formulae of the type (p 1 , . . . , p k ) I (q 1 ,...,qm) (r 1 , . . . , r n ), since the model U ′ contains only a single world.
The case for ∧ follows immediately by the induction hypothesis.
We then consider the case for ∨. Assume that U I ψ ∨ ψ ′ . Therefore there exist sets S, S ′ ⊆ U such that S I ψ and S ′ I ψ ′ , and furthermore, S ∪ S ′ = U . We may assume, by symmetry, that S contains the assignment in U that does not satisfy p. We consider two cases. 1 . Assume that S = U . Then U ′ I ψ follows directly by the induction hypothesis. Furthermore, we have ∅ I χ for every formula χ ∈ FOR(I), whence the condition
2. Assume that S is a singleton not satisfying p. Notice now that the world in S and the world in U ′ satisfy exactly the same proposition symbols. Thus S = U ′ , whence U ′ I ψ. Therefore the condition U ′ I ψ and ∅ I ψ ′ holds again, and we thus conclude that
Therefore ¬Cp cannot be expressible by a formula of I.
Corollary 6.5. The logics D and I are both strictly contained in both L D and L I .
In summary, we have shown that D < I < L D ≡ L I , where < denotes strict containment and ≡ equi-expressivity. We have also observed that L D and L I are expressively complete in the sense that they can define exactly all classes of SD-models closed under finite propositional equivalence. (See Definition 3.6 for the exact specification of finite propositional equivalence.)
Regular logics and compositionality of translations
Let t * denote the translation from I into L D we defined above. Recall that in addition to t * , we have also defined the translations t :
Furthermore, in the proof of Proposition 4.3, we described a translation from D into I; let us denote that translation by t ′ .
In this section we will take a closer look at the four translations t * , t, s and t ′ . We will establish that, in a certain sense, the translation t * is essentially different from the other three.
We begin by defining a notion of a syntactically regular logic suitable for our purposes. To this end, we first need some auxiliary definitions. Let N * be the set of all finite sequences of numbers in N (including the empty sequence). Let C be a finite or countably infinite set of operator symbols. Let d be a function that associates with each symbol in C a nonempty subset of N * ; the set d(c) is called the arity type set of c. For example, in L I , the operator I always operates on three tuples of formulae, with the middle tuple being the only one allowed to be the empty tuple, and thus the arity type set associated with I is N + × N × N + .
The set C together with the function d give rise to a set FOR(C, d) of formulae, which is defined to be the smallest set S such that the following conditions hold: and ϕ 1,1 , . . . , ϕ 1,n 1 , . . . , ϕ k,1 , . . . , ϕ k,n k ∈ S, then c (ϕ 1,1 , . . . , ϕ 1,n 1 
We call FOR(C, d) the syntactically regular set of formulae defined by C and d. We call a logic syntactically regular if the set of formulae of the logic is a syntactically regular set of formulae for some set C and a related function d. Any logic whose set of formulae is a subformula closed subset of some syntactically regular set of formulae, is called a syntactically subregular logic. Closure of a formula set F under subformulae obviously means that if
For the sake of simplicity, we will below mainly talk about regular and subregular (rather than syntactically regular and syntactically subregular) logics. In contrast, the operators ¬ and → of L D are both associated with only a single arity type, and thus we can directly regard ¬ and → as base operators.
It is easy to see that
We now define the notion of a compositional translation from one subregular logic to another. Intuitively, a compositional translation from a logic L to a logic L ′ has the property that each base operator of L is described in L ′ in a uniform way. Therefore the translation in some sense acts only on the base operators of L rather than directly on individual formulae. Thus a compositional translation can be considered to be, in a sense, simple and direct. For further discussion on compositional translations, see [Jan97] .
Assume ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k , where k ∈ N, are distinct formulae of a subregular logic L. Assume ψ(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k ) is a formula of L obtained from ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k by composing these formulae with some collection of base operators. Let X 1 , . . . , X k be novel symbols. Then ψ(X 1 , . . . , X k ) is called an operator term of L; the operator term is obtained by replacing the original ground instances of the formulae
(For example, if ϕ 1 := p and ϕ 2 := q, and if ψ(ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) := (p → q) ∨ p I q, then we obtain the operator term (X 1 → X 2 ) ∨ X 1 I X 2 by replacing ϕ 1 with X 1 and ϕ 2 with X 2 .)
Let L and L ′ be subregular logics. We identify L and L ′ with their respective sets of formulae.
there exists an operator term
i.e., the translated formula is obtained by substituting each symbol X i,j in ψ by T (ϕ i,j ). Furthermore, it is required that for each proposition symbol p in the syntax of L, the translation T (p) contains no other proposition symbols except for p. This ensures that the translation T (ϕ) of any formula ϕ contains no other proposition symbols except for those in ϕ itself. This is a natural requirement and can be essential for example when considering SD-models with a finite propositional signature, i.e, models that interpret only a finite number of proposition symbols. We note that in the team semantics literature, SD-models are in most cases indeed defined to interpret only finitely many proposition symbols.
The symbols X i,j in the above definition should be regarded as placeholders in the operator term ψ(X 1,1 , . . . , X k,n k ). Intuitively, the operator term ψ(X 1,1 , . . . , X k,n k ) provides a "uniform description" of the base operator (c, (
The above definition of a compositional translation is suitable for the purposes of the current paper and follows the standard principles of compositional translations.
Note that our translations t : Proof. Let S be an SD-model and χ 1 , χ 2 formulae of L D . We say that χ 1 and χ 2 are locally equivalent in S, if for all w ∈ S, it holds that S, w |= χ 1 iff S, w |= χ 2 .
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that a compositional translation T from D into L D exists. Consider an SD-model V consisting of exactly two assignments, one satisfying p and the other one not. Then fix a proposition symbol q so that for each w ∈ V , the assignment w satisfies q if and only if w does not satisfy p. For all other proposition symbols r ∈ PROP \ {p, q}, we assume that neither of the worlds in V satisfies r. We then define an SD-model U which is the same as V but with the interpretation of q redefined so that q is satisfied by u ∈ U if and only if u satisfies p. Let W ∈ {U, V }. We will prove the following claims about W .
for ∨. Since T (Cp) and T (q) are locally equivalent in U , we therefore have
Since U |= T (q ∨ q), we have U q ∨ q, which is a contradiction. Thus we turn to the case where T (Cp) and T (q) are locally equivalent in V . Similarly to the above, since V Cp ∨ Cp and thus V |= T (Cp ∨ Cp), we infer using the formula ψ ′ (X, Y ) that V |= T (q ∨ q). Therefore V q ∨ q, which is a contradiction.
Validities and axiomatizations
In this section we provide sound and complete axiomatizations for L D and L I . We begin by axiomatizing L C , the fragment of L D with only operators C instead of general determinacy operators D. We denote the fragment of L D that extends propositional logic PL with C by L C . The operator C has been studied previously and in a more general setting as a "non-contingency" operator, and also-in epistemic logic-as a "knowing whether" operator, see [FWvD15] and the references therein.
Capturing the validities of L
We next present a sound and complete axiomatic system AX(L C ) that captures the validities of L C . Several proofs of completeness of equivalent axiomatizations have already been provided in the literature, starting with [MR66] . For historical references and recent related work on axiomatizations of C, see the above mentioned reference [FWvD15] . Nevertheless, we will present here yet another, simple and intuitive axiomatization with a purely syntactic proof of completeness by means of reduction to the completeness of S5 (or L U ). We will then use the completeness of AX(L C ) to obtain complete axiomatizations for L D and L I .
The axiomatic system AX(L C ) is defined as follows.
Axiom schemes:
Ax0(C) A complete set of axioms for PL
Inference rules:
We will denote derivability in AX(L C ) by ⊢ C .
Proposition 7. 1 . The following inference rule, which preserves SD-validity, can be used in AX(L C ):
Proof. If ⊢ C ϕ, then ⊢ C ϕ ↔ ⊤ by PL (propositional logic). Thus ⊢ C Cϕ ↔ C ⊤ by EQ C , whence ⊢ C Cϕ by using Ax1(C) and PL.
Now, recall the following well-known complete S5 axiomatization for L U .
Axiom schemata:
Ax0(U) A complete set of axioms for PL.
We will denote derivability in L U by ⊢ S5 .
To show completeness of AX(L C ), we first extend the intuitive interdefinability of C and the universal modality to a translation
The translation ϕ → ϕ + from L C into L U is defined as follows.
The proof of the following lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 7.2. For every formula ϕ of L C , if |= ϕ then |= ϕ + , where the validity statement in each case refers to the semantics of the language in question.
The composition of the two translations, first () + and then () • , defines the following ranslation
The following lemma shows that we can derive equivalence of ϕ and its translation ϕ * in AX(L C ).
Lemma 7. 3 . We have ⊢ C ϕ ↔ ϕ * for every formula ϕ ∈ L C .
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of ϕ. The case for atoms is trivial and the cases for the Boolean connectives follow easily from the induction hypothesis using the fact that AX(L C ) is complete with respect to PL. We thus discuss the case involving Cϕ.
By the induction hypothesis, we have ⊢ C ϕ ↔ ϕ * . By the inference rule EQ C , we obtain
On the other hand, by PL, we have
Then, again using PL together with the induction hypothesis and the equivalences above, we derive
Finally, using the axiom Cθ ↔ C¬θ with θ := ϕ * and PL, we get
This concludes the proof.
Next we will show that every derivation in L U can be simulated by a derivation in AX(L C ).
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on derivations in L U . We will first prove that ⊢ C ϕ • for each axiom ϕ for L U . For propositional tautologies this is trivial.
To deal with Ax1(U), we must show that
for arbitrary θ and ψ. The following derivation does exactly this. (The steps after the first one use PL an the preceeding steps.)
To cover axiom Ax2(U), we must show that ⊢ C (θ ∧ Cθ) → θ, which is a propositional tautology.
To deal with axiom Ax3(U), we must show that
Here is the derivation.
by row 2, Ax2(C) and PL
and PL
Now it remains to establish that NEC U preserves the claim, that is, we will show that if ⊢ S5 ϕ and thus ⊢ C ϕ • by the induction hypothesis, then we also have ⊢ C ([U]ϕ) • . Thus we assume that ⊢ C ϕ • . Using NEC C (see Proposition 7.1), we infer that ⊢ C Cϕ • , and using PL, we get
We are now ready to prove the soundness and completeness of AX(L C ).
Proposition 7.5. The axiomatic system AX(L C ) is sound and complete for the validities of L C .
Proof. The soundness follows by an easy verification of the validity of all the axioms and the fact that EQ C preserves validity.
To prove completeness, assume that |= ϕ for some formula ϕ of L C . Recall that [u] ϕ is an abbreviation of ϕ ∧ Cϕ. We define, for each positive integer k, the following axiom schema:
The system AX(L D ) consists of the axiom schemata and rules of L C together with the above axiom schemata for each k ∈ Z + .
We obtain an axiomatic system AX(L I ) for L I similarly by essentially extending AX(L C ) by schemata that define by Proposition 4.4 the operator I in terms of C. The language L I does not contain C as a primitive, but the translation t given before Proposition 4.3 shows that the operator C can be expressed as ϕ I ϕ. Thus we first define AX 0 (L I ) to be the following system obtained from AX(L C ) by the substitution Cθ → θ I θ.
Axiom schemes:
Ax0( I ) A complete set of axioms for PL.
Recalling the abbreviation u ′ from Section 4, we define AX(L I ) to be the extension of AX 0 (L I ) by the following axiom schemata for all m ∈ N and k, n ∈ Z + :
where B is as in Proposition 4.4.
We denote derivability in AX(L D ) by ⊢ D and derivability in AX(L I ) by ⊢ I .
Theorem 7.6. Proof. The proofs of the two claims are very similar, so we will first present the argument for AX(L D ) and then briefly comment the claim for AX(L I ).
AX(L D
Soundness follows from the soundness of AX(L C ) and Proposition 3.3.
To prove completeness, we will use a similar argument as the one applied in the proof of Proposition 7.5. We will reduce the completeness of AX(L D ) to the already proved completeness of AX(L C ).
We first define the obvious translation tr of L D into L C which leaves all atoms and Boolean connectives intact and likewise translates Cϕ to C tr(ϕ), but treats formulae D(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k ; ψ) with k = 0 as follows. Using the equivalence established by Proposition 3.3, we put
We then prove by induction on the structure of formulae θ of L D that
The cases for proposition symbols and Boolean connectives are trivial. To cover the case for C, assume we have shown that ⊢ D ϕ ↔ tr(ϕ). We then conclude that ⊢ D Cϕ ↔ C tr(ϕ) directly by the rule EQ C .
To deal with the case for D, let θ = D(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k ; ψ), and let the induction hypothesis be that ⊢ D ϕ i ↔ tr(ϕ i ) for each i ≤ k and ⊢ D ψ ↔ tr(ψ). From here it is easy to conclude, using completeness with respect to propositional logic, that we also have ⊢ D χ ↔ tr(χ) for each χ ∈ DNF (ϕ 1 , ..., ϕ k ). Therefore, using PL, we have
whence we infer by the rule EQ C that ⊢ D C(χ ↔ ψ) ↔ C(tr(χ) ↔ tr(ψ)).
Using this equivalence and the already established fact that ⊢ D χ ′ ↔ tr(χ ′ ) for all χ ′ ∈ {ψ} ∪ DNF (ϕ 1 , ..., ϕ k ), we then infer by PL that
(tr(χ) ↔ tr(ψ)) ∧ C(tr(χ) ↔ tr(ψ)) .
From here we conclude, using propositional logic and Ax ( The completeness proof of AX(L I ) is similar. We first prove that AX 0 (L I ) is complete for the notational variant of L C that replaces Cϕ with f (ϕ) I f (ϕ), where f is a translation that keeps proposition variables and Boolean connectives intact but treats C as given above. This proof of completeness is virtually identical to the corresponding argument for AX (L C ) given above. Then the completeness of AX(L I ) is proved similarly to the way AX(L D ) was treated above, the only significant (but uncomplicated) difference being that the axioms Ax ( I k,m,n ) instead of axioms Ax (D k ) are used.
Our axiomatizations for L D and L I are not finite because we have the schemata Ax(D k ) and Ax( I k,m,n ) for infinitely many values of k, m, n. We will next show that, in fact, neither L D nor L I has a finite axiomatization. To this end, we will first define formally what we mean by a finite axiomatization. 
The road ahead
In this paper we have defined the logics L D and L I as alternatives for D and I. We have comprehensively studied the expressive powers of these four logics and argued for the naturalness of L D and L I in relation to D and I. We have also provided sound and complete axiomatizations for L D and L I . Here we discuss briefly a range of natural future developments of the present work.
Relativised determinacy operators
The determinacy of a formula by a set of formulae can be relativised to a set of possible worlds. Let θ W denote the set {w ∈ W | W, w |= θ} and define the relativised determinacy operator D θ (ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k ; ψ) such that W, w |= D θ (ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k ; ψ) iff for all u, v ∈ θ W , if the equivalence W, u |= ϕ i ⇔ W, v |= ϕ i holds for each i ≤ k, then we have W, u |= ψ ⇔ W, v |= ψ.
In particular, we define C θ ϕ = D θ (∅, ϕ). Using [u], we notice that
It is easy to see that, in a propositional language extended with both D and the standard box modality , we have the equivalence
i.e., for all Kripke models M and points w in the domain of M , the pointed model M, w satisfies either both or neither of the above formulae. On the other hand, on all models with a reflexive accessibility relation (but not in general), the box modality is definable in terms of D by ϕ := ϕ ∧ Cϕ, where Cϕ of course denotes D(∅; ϕ).
Studying D over different classes of Kripke models is an interesting open research direction, which we leave open here.
Logical determinacy and consequence
It is possible to extend the scope of D to cover arbitrary sets of formulae as follows. Let Γ denote a possibly infinite set of formulae of L D . Define W, w |= D(Γ, ψ) if for all assignments u, v ∈ W it holds that if the equivalence W, u |= ϕ ⇔ W, v |= ϕ holds for all ϕ ∈ Γ, then W, u |= ψ ⇔ W, v |= ψ.
The determinacy operator D now extends, in a rather natural sense, Tarski's logical consequence operator C defined such that C(Γ, ψ) holds if and only if W |= ψ for every state description model W such that W |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ. Thus, it should not be very surprising that D satisfies the standard axioms of logical consequence going back to Tarski. In addition, however, D satisfies some extra properties which the logical consequence operator lacks. For a discussion of related issues, see [Hum92, Hum93, Hum98] . An interesting research direction extending the present work involves relating determinacy and logical consequence in the general modal setting outlined above.
Determinacy operators and conditional knowledge
The determinacy operator D has a natural epistemic reading: the formula D(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k , ψ) can be interpreted to mean that an agent knows the truth value of the ψ relative to the truth values of the formulae ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k in the sense that the agent can always deduce the truth value of ψ if she learns the truth values of ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k . This interpretation of D leads to yet another interesting open research direction.
